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The purpose of the paper is to account for the short history of the soft law regulation of 
corporate conduct on the Budapest Stock Exchange (BSE). In theory, voluntary codes of good 
governance are expected to improve the deficiences of the existing mechanisms of corporate 
governance. In case of the Hungarian public companies the most important corporate 
governance problems are those related to the fragile safeguards of the interests of minority 
shareholders and to the lack of incentives for a much higher degree of transparency and 
disclosure. It is these two sets of issues on which the present analysis concentrates. The 
empirical core of the paper assesses the quality of information to be gained from the 
corporate governance reports of listed companies on the BSE. In order to discover links 
between the quality of information and firm characteristics we categorized the declarations 
based on their adequacy and applied binary regression analysis. We found inverse 
relationship between ownership concentration and the quality of information, while the 
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Felelős Társaságirányítási Ajánlás: új szabályozási 
eszköz a Budapesti Értéktőzsdén 




A nyilvános részvénytársaságok számára törvény írja elő, hogy évente ún. corporate 
governance jelentést készítsenek a BÉT ajánlásainak (FTA) figyelembe vételével. Az EU-
országokban szokásos szabályozást szorosan követő ajánlások elfogadása a vállalatok 
számára nem kötelező, az eltérést azonban a jelentésben indokolni kell (a „comply or explain” 
elv alkalmazása.) Jelen tanulmány az FTA bevezetésének körülményeit és működésének 
eddigi tapasztalatait foglalja össze, továbbá empírikusan vizsgálja a jelentések 
hatékonyságának egyik legfontosabb szempontját, az átláthatóság javulását. 
Az originális empírikus kutatás célja a nyilvános részvénytársaságok által 2007. évben kiadott 
felelős társaságirányítási jelentések információtartalmának értékelése volt, azaz annak 
megállapítása, hogy a jelentések képesek-e csökkenteni a tulajdonosok és a vállalati 
felsővezetés között fennálló információs aszimmetriát. A nyilatkozatokat a fenti célnak való 
megfelelés alapján osztályoztuk, s bináris regresszió alkalmazásával kerestük az információ 
minősége és a vállalati tulajdonságok közötti összefüggést. Azt találtuk, hogy míg az erősődő 
tulajdonosi koncentráció csökkenti, a növekvő részvénylikviditás javítja a nyilatkozatokból 
kinyerhető, a befektetési döntésekhez elvileg szükséges információ minőségét.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
B a c k  i n  t h e  m i d d l e  o f  t h e  1 9 9 0 s  c o d e s  o f  g o o d  g o v e r n a n c e  w e r e  i n  e f f e c t  o n l y  i n  a  f e w  
countries (mostly those belonging to the Anglo-Saxon legal system). Since then the 
popularity of codes has risen sharply around the world, especially after 1998. Today, there are 
more than sixty countries (including most of the EU member states) on the country list of 
codes registered at the European Corporate Governance Institute1. The increased interest in 
this type of soft law regulation has been connected to the globalization of capital markets, the 
increased appreciation of quality governance in the eyes of investors and the proliferation of 
the shareholder value paradigm in general. The proactive policies of international 
organization and supra-national bodies contributed significantly to the speed of  the diffusion 
of codes of good governance which show a remarkable similarity across countries, at least as 
far as their formal content is concerned.  
Hungary is a relative latecomer among the users of codes of corporate governance. The 
present codes (updated from its first, 2004 version) have been implemented by the Budapest 
Stock Exchange earlier this year. The codes were adopted and modified mainly as a result of 
the pressure from the Commission of the EU. The role of domestic market players was much 
more modest and they have not contributed significantly to the compilation of codes by 
initiating the inclusion of country-specific recommendations. 
One of the raison d’être of the codes is to improve the deficiences of the existing 
mechanisms of corporate governance. The aim of this paper is to examine how this works 
under Hungarian circumstances. The main feature of the Hungarian stock market is the high 
degree of ownership concentration of the listed companies. It follows from the dominance of 
controlling shareholders that the most important corporate governance problems are those 
related to the fragile safeguards of the interests of minority shareholders and to the lack of 
incentives for a much higher degree of transparency and disclosure. It is these two sets of 
issues on which we will concentrate when analysing the codes of good governance in practice. 
The next section of the paper gives a short account of Hungary’s transition from a 
planned to market economy in the framework of which the concept of corporate governance 
started to slowly emerge.The third section deals with the statutory regulation of corporate 
governance by the description of the relevant chapter of the modernized Company Law. In 
section 4 we turn to the Budapest Stock Exchange, the responsible body for the codes of good 
governance the implementation and the content of which will be subsequently analysed. In 
section 5 we will consider the consequences of the nature of the trigger of the Hungarian 
                                                        
1 www.ecgi.org   From this website full text versions of codes of corporate governence of different countries, 
including Hungary can be downloaded. 
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codes and show the degree of convergence with the EU guidelines. Section 6 is contains the 
results of our empirical analysis which present original inferential statistical information on 
the quality of the disclosure of companies’ compliance statements in relation with the codes. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2. HISTORICAL AND REGULATORY ANTECEDENTS 
 
 
Hungary’s modern business history began in the early 1990s. The label of late-comer is 
justified: at the time when the first influential code of good corporate governance (the 
Cadbury Code, 1992) appeared in the European Union, the Budapest Stock Exchange had 
just re-opened with less than a half dozen public companies and Hungary’s privatization 
program was still in its starting phase. Subsequently, the pace of institution-building and 
regulatory reforms accelerated, and by the end of the decade Hungary had successfully 
completed her transition to a well-functioning market economy. Yet the concept of corporate 
governance was slow to spread, due primarily to reasons of a historical and cultural nature. 
During the era of state socialism, characterized by central planning, state ownership and the 
corresponding internal organizational structure of companies, corporate governance, as 
understood in market economy terms, was completely missing both in the legal and 
economic sense.  
The turnaround in the field of legislation came in 1988 with the promulgation of a 
modernized company law, which was the first important step in breaking with the state 
socialist past in the enterprise sector and paving the way towards an economy based on 
private ownership. This law served its purpose well, and it took nine more years before the 
next substantial amendment took place. The amended 1997 Company Law, however, still did 
not explicitly address the issue of corporate governance of public joint stock companies. 
The key reform in the transition of all Central Eastern European countries was 
privatization. A survey of the literature reveals that corporate governance in Central Eastern 
Europe was largely determined by the chosen strategy of privatization and the resulting 
ownership structure of both publicly and privately held companies. In the case of Hungary, 
the primary method of privatization was direct sales of enterprises to strategic (mainly 
foreign) investors, which led to concentrated ownership and a general antagonism between 
controlling owners and minority shareholders. 
Even in the second half of the 1990s, during the height of privatization and the promising 
boom of the Budapest Stock Exchange, the need for improving and better understanding 
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corporate governance was not seriously addressed. Questions concerning the protection of  
shareholder investments or the acceptability of unequal relationships among different types 
of owners were hardly ever raised. As the theory of corporate governance would predict, the 
systematic neglect of corporate governance in Hungary has contributed to the strengthening 
of a bank-based bias in corporate finance and the underdevelopment of capital markets in 
comparison with other sectors of the economy. 
It is due primarily to external factors that awareness of the importance of good 
governance took hold in Hungary by the new millenium. Hungary’s preparation for accession 
to the European Union coincided with the Commission’s efforts to promote better corporate 
governance principles and to harmonize member state regulation in this field. The 1997 
amendment of the Hungarian Company law was done in accordance with the acquis 
communataire. Similarly, the Capital Market Act of 2002 brought regulation in this area in 
line with the respective EU laws. The Accounting Law has als o  c a u g h t  u p  w i t h  w e s t e r n  
standards. 
 
3. HARMONIZATION OF THE COMPANY LAW 
 
The process of the Europanization and thus the modernization of the Hungarian legal system 
did not lose momentum even after Hungary achieved full membership status in the European 
Union. The Commission of the EU keeps a strong eye on the on-going institution-building of 
the new member states to which Hungary belongs and the requirements of harmonization 
are a priority in their new lawmaking, amendments or fine-tuning of the existing regulations. 
The 2006 amendment of the Law on Business Associations (Act IV. of 2006. the 
“Company Law”) clearly reflects that the source of changes is to be found in the EU directives 
in the first place. From the viewpoint of the topic of this essay the most important 
improvements in the Company Law can be summarized as follows. A notable feature of 
changes is that the emphasis on the protection of interests of creditors, shareholders and 
minority shareholders in particular has been enhanced. Distinction was drawn between 
private and public companies with different rules applying for each group. The shareholders 
of public limited companies now have the choice to initiate the establishment of the Anglo-
Saxon type unitary board system or stay with the traditional two-tier board structure. The act 
deals extensively with the role of the board and prescribes that the majority of the board shall 
be made up of independent directors. It has been made clear that independent directors 
cannot be engaged in executive roles. Public limited companies are required to set up an 
audit board consisting of minimum three members from the board of directors elected by the 
general meeting. 
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The new company law unlike its predecessor has an explicit reference to the rules of 
corporate governance. It states that listed companies are guided by the Recommendations of 
the Budapest Stock Exchange for sound governance. They must provide an annual 
compliance report which has to be approved by the shareholders. As a next step the law 
prescribes that the report be posted on the official website of the company. 
The general opinion is that the provisions the new Hungarian Company Law are up to the 
levels of internationally recognized standards. Laws on the book, however, are just one part 
of the story. Research (Pistor, Raiser & Gelfer, 2000) has drawn attention to the fact that it is 
the effectiveness of the implementation of regulations, legal enforcement and the perception 
of legality where the real problems in the creation of efficient business environment and 
developed capital markets in CEEs, including Hungary start. A deeper examination of the 
persistent gap between regulations on the book on the one hand and the respect and 
enforcement of law on the other, would lead us to inquiries into the path-dependent nature of 
the evolution of legality and its cultural determinants. The discussion of these complex issues 
however, is beyond the scope of the present paper. 
 
4. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RECOMMENDATIONS   
 
The first corporate governance codes were introduced in the Budapest Stock Exchange in 
2004.   From 2008 they were replaced by an amended version and it is this latter document 
on which our present analysis focuses. The offic i a l  n a m e  o f  t h i s  “ s o f t  l a w ”  i s  C o r p o r a t e  
Governance Recommendations of the Budapest Stock Exchange to which we will refer as 
“Recommendations”, “CGR”, or “Code” interchangeably throughout this paper. It should be 
noted that principle-based, voluntary codes are an innovation in the Hungarian regulatory 
system. 
Recommendations are closely connected with the new Company Law previously 
described. There are some overlaps but the Code mostly covers issues not dealt with in the 
Company Law. Beside the harmonization requirements with the new Company Law the other 
decisive source of the updating of the Hungarian code was the then recent recommendations 
of the European Commission, namely the recommendations on an appropriate regime for the 
remuneration of directors of listed companies (2004/913/EC) and on the role of non-
executive or supervisory directors of listed companies and on the committees of the 
(supervisory) board (2005/162/EC). 
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The chapters of the CGR similarily to other national codes cover shareholders’rights and 
treatment of shareholders, responsibilities of the management and the boards, the 
establishment and the duties of committees, and the principles and procedures of disclosure. 
Transparency is crucial to the perception of the company, especially when trust and 
credibility is in need of as much strengthening as it is in Hungary. This is why we regard 
statutory disclosure as a first indispensable step in the improvement of corporate governance 
on the BSE. In their annual reports listed companies must take stock of their corporate 
governance policies and internal control practices. Further, they are expected to provide 
information as to what extent they follow the recommendations of the BSE. The method 
applied there is based on the “comply or explain” principle. If the company chooses not to 
follow the given recommendation or deviates from it in a certain manner, an explanation for 
the reasons should be provided. The Code contains also suggestions, the non-complience 
with which does not need detailed explanation. 
If not the letter, the spirit of the Code dictates that the filling of the template be not a box-
ticking exercise for the management but a means of providing true and relevant information 
for the assessment of the quality of different aspects of a given  company’s governance. Our 
empirical research which we will present in the later part of the paper shows that many 
companies do not care enough about the quality and relevance of the information they 
disclose. This we regard as an unresolved problem of the Hungarian CGR practice.  
 
5. THE TRIGGER AND THE DEGREE OF CONVERGENCE  
In the integrated global capital market not only companies but countries, stock exchanges, 
and professional bodies compete for capital (Gordon, Roe 2004) by implementing safeguards 
that prevent expropriation by agents (Fama, Jensen 1983).  The emergence of codes of 
corporate governance on national level is to eliminate uncertainty for investors, by providing 
them detailed information on the internal control mechanism of the listed companies. The  
presence of a code, however, is one thing; the other is its efficiency in enhancing the flow of 
accurate and timely information in the interest of shareholders. The fulfillment of this goal is 
dependent on a number of factors, including the origin of the triggering force. 
Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2004) building on the theories of the diffusion literature 
suggest that distinguishing between endogenous and exogenous triggering forces in creating 
and/or adopting the codes of good governance serves as a useful analytical tool. They argue 
convincingly that if new governance regulations are born out of the demand of domestic 
market actors to compensate for the deficiences in the existing system, the result will be 
increased efficiency. If, however, best practice codes are introduced as an answer to the 
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pressure by an exogenous force, it is the legitimation function of the adoption of codes that 
comes to the forefront.  
Taking on this approach we looked at the Hungarian case from the point of view of the 
triggering force. We made several interviews with the officials at the Budapest Stock 
Exchange, Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement and strategic decision makers at 
Hungarian investment companies. Based on these talks we arrived at the conclusion that it 
was almost entirely due to exogenous pressures that internationally approved codes of 
governance were added to the regulatory toolkit of the BSE. The diffusion concept was 
originated from the European Commission’s effort to harmonize the national regulations of 
corporate governance across the member states.2 The chain of the trigger followed the route  
from the Commission of the EU to the Hungarian Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement, 
which delegated the task to the BSE where a national corporate governance committee was 
set up. Following the EU guidelines and checking their compatibility with the Company Law 
(as described more in detail in the previous section) the above committee compiled the up-
dated final version Corporate Governance Recommendations of the BSE. 
The next step in our analysis of the Hungarian codes was comparing its content with the 
guidelines which were laid down in the Communication 284 of the EU Commission (COM 
284, Table A1 in the Appendix). The documents were not expected to be fully converged since 
it was open for the Hungarian regulators to contextualize the guidelines so that the Codes 
were adjusted to country-specific needs. Some authors (Hermes at al. 2007) suggest that 
domestic forces played a mentionable role in shaping the Hungarian codes of governance. 
This, however, is not supported by our analysis. 
We found that the CGR of the BSE closely follows the guidelines of COM 284 except for 
three areas (No.4, 9 and 19 in Table A1):  
1.  The rights, key agreements, direct and indirect relationships between shareholders 
holding majority stake;  
2.  Disclosure by institutional investors of the exercise of voting rights in companies in 
which they invest and the disclosure of voting practices;  
3.  Collective responsibility of all board members.  
In our view the omission of the first point (see above) from the Hungarian codes has not 
been born out of the concern for country-specific needs, since the missing of this point does 
not add to the improvement of the Hungarian corporate governance regime. On the contrary, 
it ignores a crucial corporate governance problem, namely, the one that arises from the high 
level of ownership concentration of listed companies.  
                                                        
2 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament: Modernising Company 
Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A Plan to Move Forward 
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Table 3.1 shows the ownership stakes of the three largest blockholders separately and in 
aggregate. The risk of expropriation of minority shareholders’ interest by majority owners 
increased during the last decade since aggregate holdings of the three largest blockholders 
has grown from 52,9 (Earle, Kucsera, Telegdy 2005) to 59,8 percent. Assessing the minimum 
and maximum values in Table 3.1. we can see extreme values, which raise the problem of the 
biased mean towards outliers. Median values on the other hand imply negative skewness, 
meaning that the larger portion of listed companies have dominant shareholders.   
Table 3.1.  
Ownership concentration on the BSE in the period 2001 Q4 - 2007 Q4 
(% holdings) 
Definition Mean  SD Minimum Median Maximum 
First largest blockholder  45,6  21,3  0,0 48,0 99,8 
Second largest blockholder  16,0  8,8  0,0  20,1  41,2 
Third largest blockholder  7,6  4,0  0,0  6,4  15,0 
Largest two blockholders  58,8  21,3  0,0 58,9 99,5 
Largest three blockholders  59,8  22,6  0,0 56,9 99,8 
All blockholders  64,3  28,4  0,0 62,5 99,8 
 
Note: N (number of firm-years) = 625. N varies by half year with the maximum of 48 in 
2002 Q2, 2003 Q4, 2004 Q2, 2005 Q2. SD - Standard deviation. A blockholder is defined 
as an owner with higher direct ownership than 5 percent 
Source: Budapest Stock Exchange; Magyar Tőkepiac; website of listed companies; 
authors' computations 
 
Figure 3.1 shows that it is non-resident institutional investors that dominate the market 
followed by the “others” group which comprises governmental agencies and individuals. 
Local institutional investors command only a 6,2% stake and their investment practices 
further confirm their status of minority shareholders. This domestic group has a low level of 
ownership in listed companies because regulations3, with an eye on risk management, limit 
their holdings in one company to a great extent. Their portfolio strategies, mostly determined 
by their foreign headquarters4  are also moderately conducive to investments in domestic 
equities.  
In order to empirically confirm that concentrated ownership leads to the exploitation of 
company resources by majority shareholders, we conducted a survey research among the 
strategic decision makers of local mutual funds. Out of the 12 interviewees 11 claimed that for 
                                                        
3 Act CXX of 2001 on Capital Market, Act LX of 2003 on Insurance Institutions and the Insurance Business, Act 
LXXXII of 1997 on Private Pensions and Private Pension Funds, Act XCVI of 1993 on Voluntary Mutual 
Insurance Funds. 
4 Except for one single investment company that is owned by domestic shareholders. 
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them it is the majority owners and strategic owners with majority stake that represent the 
highest risk of expropriation.  
Figure 3.1. 
Ownership distribution of resident and non-resident institutional investors on  
BSE by 2007 Q4. 
28,13%
6,20% 65,67%
Other Resident institutional investors Non-resident institutional investors
 
Source: Budapest Stock Exchange; authors' computations 
 
Concerning the other two missing elements of COM 284 from the CCG of BSE we deem 
that the disclosure of voting practices of domestic institutional investors is of lesser 
importance due to their low level of ownership stake in listed companies and their inability to 
actively participate in corporate decision making. As far as the issue of the collective 
responsibility of all board members is concerned it is unanimously objected by corporate 
decision makers.  
6. THE QUALITY OF DISCLOSURE   
The second issue which we will explore empirically is the quality of disclosure provided by 
listed companies. We asked ourselves the question: To what degree CGR compliance reports 
contribute to the correction of information asymmetry?  Again, this approach is crucial from 
the point of view of the interest of the minority shareholders. For blockholders (who 
dominate the companies of BSE as seen in Table 3.3) the lack of transparency seldom causes 
a problem since they have an easy access to internal reporting systems not available for 
smaller owners, for whom CGR reports remain the primary source of information.  
While investigating the question of the validity and usefulness of information provided by 
CGR reports for minority shareholders we also wanted to know what attributes of companies 
can be linked to the quality of information they reveal in their annual corporate governance 
statements. 
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Table 3.3.
Descriptive statistics of the listed companies on the BSE , 2007 Q4. 
Category    Mean    SD    Minimum    Median    Maximum  
Price (in HUF)  5 364  8 613  24  1 304  33 055 
Capitalization (in million 
HUF)  192 255  538 522  89  13 687  2 580 103 
D/E 1,11  3,24  0,00  0,15  18,25 
Number of employees  2 673  6 223  2  325  33 062 
Free Float (in %)  39,01  27,45  0,20  37,73  89,15 
1st largest blockholder (in %)  40,09 25,44  10,85  36,25  89,78 
2nd largest blockholder (in 
%) 16,16  9,65  2,68  12,54  37,76 
3rd largest blockholder (in 
%) 9,86  4,88  5,05  8,16  24,62 
4th largest blockholder (in 
%)  7,45 4,30  0,50  6,30  18,16 
5th largest blockholder (in 
%)  6,51 1,08  5,19  6,35  8,65 
6th largest blockholder (in 
%) 5,47  0,25  5,17  5,47  5,78 
Source: Website of Budapest Stock Exchange; Reuters database; authors' computations 
Note: N (number of firms) = 37. SD - Standard deviation. Price stand for the sport price 
of the company at the time of the announcement of the CG report. All outstanding shares 
a r e  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  p a r t  o f  f r e e  f l o a t  o r  a r e  p u b l i c l y  t r a d e d  u n l e s s  i t  i s  h e l d  b y  a  
blockholder.A blockholder is defined as an owner with at least 5 percent direct ownership 
stake.  
 
We hypothesize that the quality of disclosure is in positive relationship with the size of 
the company, equity financing, liquidity and the presence of minority owners. To capture 
these four exogenous factors we use capitalization data, debt-to-equity (D/E, hereafter) ratio, 
free float share and holdings of the largest owner respectively. We have chosen these 
indicators for the following reasons. First, research (Griffin, Lemmon 2002) has shown that 
stock market analysts pay more attention to larger as opposed to smaller (measured by 
capitalization) companies. This implies that smaller companies are more likely to give empty 
explanations for the deviation from the statement of the code as the threat of being 
discovered and published is not so severe. Second, using  D/E (long term liability to 
shareholders’ equity) as an indicator for showing the effect of equity financing follows an easy 
logic. The more a company relies on external equity instead of debt financing, the more it 
considers the cost of equity important. In order to minimize the financial risk for the 
investors the company provides better and more detailed information about its internal 
control mechanisms which reduces the cost of financing. Third, the figures of free float as the 
variable for liquidity are to mimic the speed of the flow of information (Heflin and Shaw, 
2000). News about companies with higher free float travels faster in the market which, as in 
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the case of analysts' coverage, increases the speed of price reaction. Fourth, the stronger the 
position of the largest blockholders is, the less is the incentive to care about the proper degree 
of transparency. 
6.1. METHODOLOGY 
We conducted our analysis on the corporate governance reports of the 37 listed companies in 
the Budapest Stock Exchange as of the fourth quarter of 2007. Reports were downloaded 
from the homepage of the BSE.  
To depict the quality of disclosure we constructed five categories of “answer 
(explanation)”, which are illustrated by a sample in Table 3.4. The categories are the 
following:  category 1 – the answer is “Yes”; category 2 – the company claims that during the 
year that the report covers no such event has taken place; category 3 – the company declares 
that a higher order law or regulation5 is followed; category 4 – the company argues that the 
issue raised is inadequate for the company due to firm specific reasons. In this latter case it is 
of great importace that  company specific reasons are elaborated and the chosen alternative is 
presented in detail; category 5 – the explanation is either missing or inadequate.  
                                                        
5 E.g.: Capital Market Act, Company Law, Financial Company Act, Regulation of the Budapest Stock Exchange 
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Table 3.4.  
Samples of explanations  according to different “answer” categories. 
Category Explanation  (answer) 
2 
R 2.6.3. Board members informed the Supervisory Board/Audit Committee if they 
received an offer of Board membership or an offer of an executive management position 
in a company which is not part of the company group.  
 
No, Above described situation has not happened so far 
3 
R 2.7.7/2. The Remuneration Statement includes information about the 
remuneration of individual members of the Managing Body, the Supervisory Board, and 
the executive management.  
 
No, According to the Dutch law it is not needed to publish the remuneration of 
individual members of the Managing Body and the Supervisory body. The company 
follows the Dutch law and Dutch Corporate Governance and published just the total 
amount of remuneration of all members, which Management Board accepted as 
satisfactory information also due to the low number of the Management Board 
Members.  
4 
R 2.8.6. The company created an independent Internal Audit function which 
reports to the Audit Committee.  
 
No, just the independent external auditor has been appointed and approved by the 
general meeting, the function of the internal Audit is provided by the Internal Audit 
team, that is reporting to the Chairman of the Supervisory Board.  
5 
R 2.8.6/2. The Internal Audit reported at least once to the Audit Committee on the 
operation of risk management, internal control mechanisms and corporate governance 
functions.  
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We will analyze the quality of disclosure in two ways. First, we assess the distribution of 
answers in the five categories for each statement and by assigning the statements in groups 
depending on the goal they want to achieve we will be able to show which area of corporate 
governance seems to be the most problematic. Secondly we will run binary regression in 
order to establish relationship between our independent variables and the quality of 
disclosure. 
To run binary regression we had to transform the five categories into two groups bearing 
in mind that the aim of the assessment is to distinguish between adequate and inadequate 
answers (explanations). The first four categories are considered as adequate or satisfactory 
answers. Category one is straightforward as it implies compliance with the statement. In case 
of categories 2, 3, 4 the shareholder is able to acquire sufficient information on the reasons of 
noncompliance and also to learn about substitute solutions. Answers falling into the 5th 
category are labeled as inadequate. According to this scheme answers in the first four 
categories were converted into binary variable 1, while unsatisfactory explanations were 
concerted into 0.  
The number of answers (explanations) falling into the five categories are displayed in 
columns 2 – 6 of Table A2. in the Appendix. The answers in the five categories after the 
conversion are presented in columns 3 – 4 under binary variables. The last two columns of 
the table show the regression coefficients.  
  
6.2 RESULTS  
Based on the Corporate Governance Recommendations of the BSE we distinguished among 
four areas of control and the statements were grouped accordingly: (1) Shareholders' rights 
and treatment of shareholders; (2) Responsibilities of the Managing Body and the 
Supervisory Board; (3) Committees; (4) Transparency and disclosure.  
Table 3.5. shows that inadequate answers (explanations) are detectable in all areas. 
Serious deficiencies are to be found in descending order in the area of “Committees”, 
followed by the “Responsibilities of the Managing Body and the Supervisory Board”, 
“Transparency and disclosure” and finally, “Shareholders' rights and treatment of 
shareholders.” The majority of statements under the heading of “Committees” was answered 
but in cases of the negative answer the explanations missed to provide information on the 
alternative actually applied by the company. Answers to questions related to the creation and 
the role of nomination companies serve as typical examples.  
Company specific type of explanations mainly argued that the size of the company does 
not justify the creation of committees and some other bodies and stated that the 
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corresponding tasks are carried out through less formal and flexible ways. Answers belonging 
to the “guidance by higher order” category indicated the choice of regulation covered by the 
Company Law, Capital Market Act, or other rules of the BSE. In some cases references to 
foreign laws were also made. 
 
Table 3.5.  
Area distribution of answer categories  
 Areas 
    1  2 3 4 
Inadequate 2,70% 11,67% 35,27% 10,30% 
Company specific  3,60% 16,28% 36,08% 11,32% 
Higher order  2,10% 2,64% 3,65% 7,77% 
No occasion  21,02% 13,64% 7,03% 7,77% 
Full compliance  70,57% 55,77% 17,97% 62,84% 
Total 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 
Note: The four areas are the following: (1) Shareholders' rights and treatment of 
shareholders; (2) Responsibilities of the Managing Body and the Supervisory Board; (3) 
Committees; (4) Transparency and disclosure. 
 
The “No occasion” type of answers typically arose when the statement focused on an 
event which was not likely to occur in every year. Examples include the reporting obligations 
of board members in case of change in the status of their independence.  
The case-by-base examination and interpretation of answers led us to the conclusion that 
most of the companies listed on the BSE have not recognized the importance of the provision 
of good quality information. Thus, the soft law in itself does not seem to be a strong enough 
incentive to lead to a significantly higher degree of transparency. 
Next, we return to our hypotheses about the possible connection between company 
characteristics variables and the quality of disclosure.Table A2.(Annex) presents the 
numerical results of the binary regression.  
We assumed that the size of the companies and the debt-to-equity ratios are in causal 
relationship with the readiness to reveal adequate information. The results of our calculation, 
however, were statistically so weak that we had to reject this causality. 
For the two other variables - the share free float and the weight of minority shareholders- 
the summarized calculations of the binary regression are displayed in Table 3.6. Based on 
these results our assumptions for these cases can be neither accepted nor rejected.  
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Table 3.6.  
The direction of the relationships between exogenous variables and the quality 
of information in the four areas of the code. 
Areas Exogenous  variables 
 Largest  Free  Float 
    + - + - 
1  1 0 0 0 
2 4  8 10/5* 6 
3  3 8/3* 7  2/1 
4 2  3  6/4*  1 
Note: The four areas are the following: (1) Shareholders' rights and treatment of 
shareholders; (2) Responsibilities of the Managing Body and the Supervisory Board; (3) 
Committees; (4) Transparency and disclosure. 
 
Although the results of the regression are unconvincing, we still believe that the outcomes 
lean more towards our original hypotheses. In Table 3.6. we presented the number of 
statements where the relationship with the variables is interpretably positive or negative. In 
the first area (“Shareholders' rights and treatment of shareholders”) there was only one 
statement with which companies complied as the size of the ownership stake of the largest 
owner increased. In the other three areas regression coefficients implying negative 
relationship outweigh the positive ones. This, in line with our hypotheses means that the 
increase in the size of the ownership block generates more inadequate answers 
(explanations). In another words, minority shareholders of a company with strongly 
dominant shareholders are less likely to receive quality information from the assessment of 
the company’s report of corporate governance practices. This argumentation is further 
supported in the area of “Committees”, where three out of the eight coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 5 and 10 percent level.  
Regression coefficients displaying the relationship between the quality of disclosure and 
the extent of free float are mixed as well. Contemporaneously positive figures outweigh the 
negative ones supporting thus our original premise, i.e. higher liquidity increases the 
provision of valid answers. In another words, the faster flow of information via more efficient 
price adjustments pressure companies to decrease information asymmetry. Due to a possible 
inverse relationship between liquidity and the dominance of blockholders we tested for 
multicolinearity and were able to reject it.  
To sum up: two of our four hypotheses can be partially accepted. The outcome of the 
computation indicate that the extent of dominance of the largest shareholders and the 
liquidity of shares induce a degree of systematic deviation from the validity of “comply or 
explain” declarations.  
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION  
The appearance of a best practice code of corporate governance is a recent phenomenon in 
Hungary. It is only from this year that companies are obliged by law to publish their 
adherence to the codes or justification for non-compliance in their annual reports. Given this 
short history of experience we had to be cautious with the interpretation of our research 
results.  
The purpose of this paper was to describe the emergence of CGR in Hungary and to 
examine how this innovative regulation of the Budapest Stock Exchange works in practice. 
We also tried to back our verbal arguments by the empirical analysis of some aspects of the 
codes in action. 
The introduction of the codes was the direct consequence of the EU Commission’s 
initiative to harmonize national corporate governance regulations across the member 
states.Thus, the trigger for the implementation of CGR in Hungary came from an exogenous 
source with little participation of domestic market actors. We subscribe to the view of those 
researchers who claim that the source of the trigger has strong implications for the efficiency 
of CGR. Top-down codes that are met by the indifference and passivity of investors and other 
market participants as it is the case in Hungary at present, makes the diffusion of the true 
spirit of good governance difficult. Also, while the appearance on paper of Hungarian laws 
and codes that govern corporate behaviour and disclosure matches European standards, the 
enforcement of regulations leaves much to be desired. 
Based on the assessment of the corporate governance reports of listed companies we 
inferred that the quality of disclosure is not sufficient enough to eliminate the problem of 
information asymmetry it was designed to do.  I n  a l l  f o u r  a r e a s  o f  t h e  c o d e  w e  f o u n d  
companies which either missed to explain the underlying reason of divergence from the code 
or provided inadequate explanation. We attribute this behaviour to the weak motivation of 
companies to court investors by increased transparency, which in turn, is explained by their 
low dependence on external equity financing. On the BSE the pressure from minority 
shareholders is fully missing as their power in “devaluating” the company and making it an 
acquisition target is negligible. Market for corporate control, the main instrument in 
disciplining the management, is not in practice on the Hungarian market. This fact originates 
also from the high level of ownership concentration and as a consequence, the lower level of 
liquidity of shares in line with the slow pace of the flow of information. This causal 
relationship was partially supported by the results of our regression analysis, where we found 
that concentration decreases, while higher liquidity increases the quality of disclosure.  
Evidence drawn from literature shows that in countries where the codes of good 
governance have been around for a longer time, are well-established in the system and are 
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sufficiently monitored,  there is a direct positive link  between financial penalities and 
rewards, even companies’ performance on the one hand, and the compliance with the codes 
on the other. While this could be a distant goal for Hungary, at present it is the limitations of 
the codes that prevail. On the short run, the main merit of the Recommendations of the 
Budapest Stock Exchange remains their educational and awareness raising function. 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1.  
Guidelines of the Communication 284 of the European Commission (COM-284) 
   Enhancing corporate governance disclosure 
1  The operation of the shareholder meeting and its key 
powers 
2  The description of shareholder rights and how they 
can be exercised 
3  The composition and operation of the board and its 
committees 
4  The shareholders holding major holdings, and their 
voting and control rights as well as key agreements 
5  The other direct and indirect relationships between 
these major shareholders and the company 
6  Any material transactions with other related parties 
7  The existence and nature of a risk management 
system 
8 
A reference to a code on corporate governance, 
designated for use at national level, with which the 
company complies or in relation to which it explains 
deviations 
  For institutional investors: 
9 
To disclose their investment policy and their policy 
with respect to the exercise of voting rights in 
companies in which they invest 
10 To disclose to their beneficial holders at their request 
how these rights have been used in a particular case 
  Strengthening shareholders' rights 
11
Shareholders of listed companies should be provided 
with electronic facilities to access the relevant 
information in advance of General Meetings 
12 Provisions for cross-border voting 
13 Shareholder democracy: The one share – one vote 
principle 
  Modernizing the board of directors 
14
In areas where it is possible for conflicts of interest to 
rise (remuneration and supervision of the audit, 
reappointment of directors), decisions should be 
made by non-executive directors 
15 Disclosure of remuneration policy in the annual 
accounts 
16 Disclosure of details of remuneration of individual 
directors in the annual accounts 
17
Prior approval by the shareholder meeting of share 
and share option schemes in which directors 
participate 
18 Proper recognition in the annual accounts of the costs 
of such schemes for the company 
19 Collective responsibility of all board members 
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Table A2.  
Number of answers (companies) in the answer (explanation) categories and the 
results of the binary regression. 
Statements of 
CCG  Answer categories  Binary variables  Regression coefficient 
    1 2 3 4 5 1  0  Largest  FF 
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Note: Statements of CCG – recommendations of the code of corporate governance issued 
by the Budapest Stock Exchange. Standard error shown in parentheses, *** - statistically 
significant at 1% level, ** - statistically significant at 5% level, * - statistically significant at 
10% level. Largest - Ownership stake of the largest shareholder; FF - Free float; Binary 
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